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Abstract
The connection between entrepreneurship and economic organization is
an under-researched topic in the economics of organization.  This paper
argues that key insights of the Austrian school of economics with respect
to entrepreneurship and the nature and role of property rights and
ownership may be useful ingredients in the economics of organization.
Thus, we show that incorporating Austrian ideas allows to give new
answers to such issues as who will be the principal and who will be the
agent; how joint surplus in an productive relation will be split and who
will own alienable assets.
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1I. Introduction
In the view of Frank Knight (1921) — the founder of the theory of the firm — firm
organization, profit, and the entrepreneur are closely related phenomena.  In his
view, these arise as, respectively, an embodiment, a result and a cause of
commercial experimentation (Demsetz 1988a).  Very few economists have followed
Knight in his linking together the existence of the firm, profit, and
entrepreneurship.  Notably, entrepreneurship is largely neglected in the modern
economics of organization (as in most of modern economics).  However, as we shall
argue, introducing the notion of entrepreneurship has profound consequences for
the understanding of economic organization — in the sense of different systems of
property rights (contractual structures, governance structures, ownership) —,
consequences that are different, yet complementary to those of the modern
economics of organization.1
In order to explicate these consequences we take our starting point in ideas
and insights associated with the Austrian school of economics, and not just ideas on
entrepreneurship.2  A neglected chapter in the history of the economics of property
rights and ownership is constituted by Austrian school economists, such as Menger
(1871), Böhm-Bawerk (1883), and Mises (1936, 1949).  Our aim in this paper is not to
provide a detailed historical exegesis of Austrian contributions to property rights
theory per se.  Rather, we are interested in how some of the characteristics of the
Austrian view of property rights connect to the Austrians’ well-known emphasis on
entrepreneurship (Hayek 1948, 1968; Mises 1949; Kirzner 1973; O’Driscoll and Rizzo
1985; Lachmann 1986), and how these insights contribute to our understanding of
economic organization.
More specifically, one way in which notions of entrepreneurship relate to
property rights reasoning (and vice versa) begins from recognizing that assets have
multiple attributes (Hayek 1948; Barzel 1997).  The attributes of assets include not
only known present uses and characteristics, but also uses and characteristics that
are presently unknown (at least to some agents) but which may be discovered and
created through entrepreneurial action (Knight 1921; Hayek 1948; Shackle 1972;
Kirzner 1973).  We shall argue that the combination of ideas on entrepreneurship
and ideas on property rights yields several implications for economic organization
and the modeling thereof.   The most important such implications are the following
ones.
First, the economist who takes an entrepreneurial starting point must
recognize that the contracting space is in principle always open-ended, so that new
                                                 
1 For two companion papers, of more methodological nature, to the present paper, see Foss (1999)
and Foss and Foss (2000b).
2 We don’t pretend this paper to be an orthodox Austrian paper, though.  There may be much that
orthodox Austrians may take issue with.  However, we draw broad inspiration from what we take to
be key Austrian ideas.
2margins may be discovered over which agents may optimize their gains.3   Second,
entrepreneurial discovery of new margins will not necessarily lead to increases in
joint surplus; for example, destructive rent-seeking may well be one outcome of
entrepreneurial activity.  Third, one important function of contracts and property
rights systems is to implement the optimal combinations between “productive” and
“destructive” entrepreneurial activities, that is, those that increase, respectively
decrease, joint surplus.4  We present this argument in the context of incomplete
contracts, and argue that there are not only costs but also benefits of contractual
incompleteness; as agents become less constrained, they are likely to engage in
destructive and productive entrepreneurship.  Given this, there is an optimal trade-
off between these two types of entrepreneurship that may be implemented through
contractual constraints. As we shall argue, this partly accounts for structures of
ownership and for the structure of contracts, thus adding determinants of economic
organization that complement those traditionally considered in the modern
economics of organization (i.e., moral hazard, the hold-up problem). Fourth,
because the Austrian perspective suggests that entrepreneurial abilities are
unevenly distributed and are likely to be tacit (Hayek 1945), the productive
opportunities that can be realized is a function of economic organization.  Thus, one
property rights arrangement may stimulate entrepreneurial discovery to a greater
extent than another arrangement. As we argue, this means that who will be the
principal and who the agent in a productive relation has efficiency implications —
an issue that is not treated in the standard principal-agent story.
 The design of the paper is as follows.  We begin by briefly discussing the
notion of entrepreneurship in Austrian economics, and by pointing out that
Austrians were among the first economists to take an interest in property rights and
ownership as economic categories.  We emphasize that entrepreneurship and
property rights are complementary concepts, and that one way in which to bring
the concepts into closer contact springs from the notions that most productive assets
are multi-attribute in nature and that entrepreneurship may be understood as the
discovery and capture of rights to valued attributes of such assets.   As we define it,
when an individual captures economic rights (i.e., takes control over attributes) that
reduces joint monetary surplus he is engaging in destructive entrepreneurship;
when capture increases surplus, he is engaging in productive entrepreneurship
(Section II, “Entrepreneurship and Property Rights”).  We then show that Austrian
perspectives on how property rights, ownership and entrepreneurship can be
modeled by means of a simple example, in which efficient economic organization
selects an optimal combination of destructive and productive entrepreneurship.  It
is also possible, in the context of the example, to determine which one of two
                                                 
3 See Foss and Foss (2000b) for a discussion of how this heuristic contrasts with the conventional
modeling approach in contract theory.  Of course, in actual modeling, contracting spaces are
somehow closed, because of the immense mathematical complexities of working with open spaces.
We invoke the notion of an open contracting space as a feature of the interpretation and application
of the model.
4 These are Baumol’s (1990) terms.  For a discussion of the value issues that are involved here, see
Ricketts (1987).
3entrepreneurial individuals will assume the role of principal and who of agent; how
they will share the surplus, and who will own the asset in the relation (section III,
“Implications for Economic Organization”).  We finally discuss how our approach
relates to and differs from other approaches to economic organization (Section IV,
“Other Approaches to Economic Organization”).
II.  Entrepreneurship and Property Rights
Entrepreneurship: Substantive and Methodological Implications
Modern Austrian economists (notably Hayek 1968; Kirzner 1973, 1997;
Lachmann 1986; O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985; Littlechild 1986) view the market as an
ongoing process of discovery.  In this conception, agents’ plans are based on
incomplete, imperfect and subjectively held knowledge about the plans of other
agents.  Crucially, agents’ ignorance goes beyond the conventional asymmetric
information paradigm to also include sheer ignorance (Kirzner 1997; Foss 1999).
This results in behavior that is off the equilibrium path and in the emergence of
disequilibrium prices.  However, alert entrepreneurs “… grasp the opportunities for
pure entrepreneurial profit created by temporary absence of full adjustment”
(Kirzner 1997: 69), so that a “... systematic process is created in which market
participants acquire more and more accurate and complete mutual knowledge of
potential supply and demand attributes” (idem: 62; emph. in original).  In this
scheme, equilibrium is seen as “the complete absence of sheer ignorance.” Although
equilibrium in this sense is, according to the Austrians, never reached, there is a
systematic tendency towards equilibrium because of the crucial underlying claims
that everybody possesses entrepreneurial abilities (albeit to differing extents) so that
agents do have a tendency to discover those margins over which they can optimize.5
An entrepreneurial perspective contains both methodological and substantive
implications for the theory of economic organization, as we argue  next.
Thus, in the context of the theory of economic organization, taking an
entrepreneurial starting point means recognizing that the contracting space is in
principle always open-ended; the analyst should allow for the possibility of surprise
and discovery (Littlechild 1986).6  While many may agree on an abstract level with
the idea of such open-ended’ness, controversy may arise over how this should be
reflected in modeling.   For example, it may be argued to conflict with the Savage
notion of “small worlds,” and hence make the calculation of expected utility ¾ for
example, from a principal-agent relation ¾ impossible (cf. Macleod 1994).
However, a way around these problems is to argue that decision-makers
deliberately construct closure around decision problems in order to make consistent
                                                 
5 However, this tendency to discover hitherto unnoticed opportunities for gain is by no means
automatic or perfect. In Kirzner’s view, the economy is at any moment characterized by widespread
ignorance, and many profit opportunities are simply never exploited.
6 See Foss and Foss (2000b) for a discussion of how this heuristic contrasts with the conventional
modeling approach in contract theory.
4plans (although they may still be ignorant of many things) and that they optimize
relative to what they believe to be important to their plans, taking into account the
possibility that plans may be overthrown by unexpected contingencies.  Thus, one
can have optimization and (ex ante) equilibrium in an open-ended setting (Hayek
1937).  This means that contracting entrepreneurs may enter into what they believe
on an ex ante basis to be optimal contracts.
With respect to substantive implications for the theory of economic
organization, it should be noted that the Austrian (Kirznerian) view of the
entrepreneurial market process is painted with a broad brush, and that little specific
is actually being said about both the nature of alertness and the market process.
Because of this, critics have interpreted alertness as little more than luck (Demsetz
1983).7  Although the emphasis on alertness have brought many fruitful insights (cf.
Kirzner 1997), it is arguably narrow to identify entrepreneurship only with
alertness.  Entrepreneurs also create plans based on imagination (Shackle 1972; Witt
1998) and judgment (Knight 1921).  We find it a challenging and worthwhile task to
incorporate such notions of entrepreneurship into the theory of economic
organization, because they direct our attention to substantive phenomena that so far
have not been treated in the theory of economic organization, such as, we will
argue, the potentially beneficial aspects of contractual incompleteness and the
efficiency implications of who in a relation will assume a directing role.  One way in
which entrepreneurship and economic organization may make contact is via
insights in the allocation of property rights. As we discuss next, this is a particularly
fitting starting point, since Austrian school economists are important precursors of
modern property rights economics.
Austrian Precursors of Property Rights Economics
Since Coase’s (1960) seminal paper, the notion of property rights has become
increasingly important in modern economics.  Coase’s paper gave rise to a spate of
work in the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s on property rights systems and the
theory of the firm (Alchian 1965; Demsetz 1967; Alchian and Demsetz 1972).  A
more recent, and in many ways different approach to property rights, based more
on game theory than on price theory, emerged with Grossman and Hart (1986), and
now arguably defines the way in which the modern formal economist thinks about
property rights and ownership.8  However, property rights economics goes back
longer in time than Coase (1960).  Thus, it has often been noted that Knight (1924)
included property rights considerations in his critique of Pigovian welfare
economics. However, a number of Austrian school economists constitute an
                                                 
7 Moreover, there is an implicit claim that the equilibrium towards which the market process is
heading is an optimal one  — a claim which is problematic given that very little specific is being said
in this theory about market dynamics (e.g., the resulting equilibrium may be sensitive to the order of
play), institutions (e.g., incentives for entrepreneurship depend on property rights), and the
interaction between dynamics and institutions (e.g., how property rights structures enhance and
constrain entrepreneurial activity).
8 Foss and Foss (2000a) compare the two approaches.
5important, but neglected chapter in the history of property rights economics.  This is
not the place to engage in a detailed historical exegesis, but it is worth noting that
the Austrians held somewhat unconventional views of property rights and
ownership, views that in many ways dovetail with the entrepreneurial perspective
that we detail later.
Thus, Menger (1871) begins (conventionally) by defining property rights as
economic categories, arising out of scarcity, and then moves on (unconventionally)
to noting that ownership affords flexibility in the face of uncertainty. For example,
he observes that fire extinguishers and medicine chests are owned precisely because
of the unpredictability of the relevant states of nature (cf. also Littlechild 1986 and
Loasby 1999).  Böhm-Bawerk (1883) provides a lengthy and sophisticated discussion
of the relation between the law, ownership and property rights.  Mises (1936: 27)
points out that ownership refers to “the power to use economic goods,” and he
emphatically stresses that “… the economic significance of the legal should have lies
only in the support it lends to the acquisition, the maintenance and the regaining of
the natural having” (emphasis in original).  In a later work, he noted the connection
between property rights and externalities (Mises 1949: 654-655), and rationalized the
emergence of various institutions of property in terms of considerations of changing
scarcities (1949: 650, 678, 679) (Foss 1994). These Austrian insights on property
rights have not been fully assimilated into mainstream property rights economics,
but contain important lessons for the economics of organization.  Thus, in the works
of the older Austrians we find the ideas that ownership of assets may ”protect”
against uncertainty, that a primary purpose of the institution of ownership is to
allocate rights to new uses of owned assets, and that there is fundamental
distinction between economic and legal rights.  None of these insights are
mainstream property rights economics insights.9 Certainly for historical reasons, we
may take them to be distinctively Austrian insights.  In the following sections, we
briefly explicate these Austrian insights, explaining in the process how they
dovetail with notions of entrepreneurship.
Legal Ownership and Economic Rights
Considered from an economic point of view, what does it mean to own an
asset? Until the publication of Coase (1960), this issue was largely neglected.  Much
of the post-Coasian property rights literature (e.g., Alchian 1965; Demsetz 1964,
1967; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Barzel 1987, 1994, 1997; Umbeck 1981) dealt with
the meaning of ownership, the relationship between property rights and ownership,
and the importance of legal considerations for understanding ownership. However,
no clear understanding emerged of issues such as how much exclusivity over uses
of assets is required before one qualifies as “owner”; what determines the observed
concentration of different types of rights in the hand one agent; and what is the role
played by legal considerations in the understanding of ownership (see Foss and
Foss 2000a). A main ambiguity in the literature concerns the extent to which
                                                 
9 Which is not to say that they have been completely absent from the property rights literature.  For
example, Barzel (1997) puts much stress on the distinction between economic and legal rights.
6ownership is defined by the recognition by others of a claim to ownership, that is,
the extent to which exclusivity is based on a (explicit or implicit) recognition by
other parties of the property rights of the owner or by the owner’s own ability to
maintain exclusivity.
One may attempt to solve this ambiguity in various ways.  One is to drop the
concept entirely for purposes of economic analysis (while recognizing that the
concept makes perfect legal sense), and instead concentrate exclusively on property
rights (as in Coase 1960).  However, an Austrian perspective suggests that this
strategy run into problems in the face of unforeseen uses of assets.  In this case,
there is a need for an institution that allocates these use rights (see later).  In fact,
this institution is the one that is normally called private ownership. A second
strategy is to adopt a working definition of ownership as always comprising a
certain minimum bundle of property rights, irrespective of time, place and
institutions (e.g., Alchian 1965). A third strategy is to identify ownership with
claims to exclusivity that are privately enforced and/or are enforced by various
legal and non-legal institutions.  This strategy makes ownership contingent on what
is seen as constituting a recognized claim (Umbeck 1981), so that ownership
essentially becomes an expectation that an agent holds with respect to his ability to
use and receive income from certain assets.  We shall argue that this expectation
depends not only on enforcement issues (i.e., the traditional focus of the property
rights literature) but also on entrepreneurship.
Attributes, Entrepreneurship, and Ownership
In order to see how entrepreneurship connects to issues of property rights and
ownership, it is convenient to take the work of Barzel (1987, 1994, 1997, 1999) as a
starting point.  He consistently defines notions of property rights and ownership in
terms of expectations.  This is highly consistent with the Austrian emphasis on
subjectivism (e.g., O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985).  Thus, Barzel (1994: 394; emphasis in
original) defines, echoing Mises (1936: 27), a property right as
... an individual’s net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to directly
consume the services of the asset, or to consume it indirectly through
exchange. A key word is ability: The definition is concerned not with what
people are legally entitled to do but with what they believe they can do.
And like Mises, Barzel stresses the importance of the distinction between legal and
economic rights.  Whereas the former refers to a legally recognized holding of a title
to an asset, the latter refers to those property rights over the attributes of an asset
that agents expect to control. Attributes are characteristics and possible uses of
assets.10  Agents then may have different degrees of control over attributes of assets
and thus more or less secure property rights over the asset.
                                                 
10 Thus,  the notion of ”attributes” strictly speaking also covers contingent goods.  But often it is most
convenient to think of attributes as the various functional characteristics of an asset or as the single
physical components of an asset.
7Most assets are multi-attribute in nature. Although Barzel stresses property
rights to known attributes of assets as the relevant units of analysis, we think it is
important to stress that most assets have multiple non-specified and not yet
discovered attributes. This also creates a role for asset ownership that is hard to
grasp when entrepreneurship is assumed away.  Demsetz points out that the notion
of ”full private ownership” over assets is ”vague,” and ”must always remain so,”
because ”... there is an infinity of potential rights of actions that can be owned … It
is impossible to describe the complete set of rights that are potentially ownable”
(Demsetz 1988b: 19).  It is true, of course, that if one thinks of ownership as the
possession of a bundle of well specified and enforced rights, the notion of full
private ownership is indeed “vague” ¾ at least when new hitherto unimagined
attributes of assets may be discovered by alert entrepreneurs.   However, the notion
of asset ownership need not be as vague. In particular, this notion might well be
indispensable for the analysis of an entrepreneur economy.
The basic reason is that asset ownership confers a bundle of rights, including
rights to hitherto undiscovered attributes of the relevant asset. 11 There are two
aspects of this, one relating to the acquisition of a bundle of rights, and one relating
to capture of hitherto undiscovered attributes.   With respect to the former aspect,
ownership reduces information, communication and contracting costs relative to a
situation in which it was necessary to contract over all these rights.  This function of
ownership is perhaps particularly visible in an entrepreneurial perspective.12   First,
ownership eases the process of entrepreneurial arbitraging (Kirzner 1973, 1997)—
and hence eases the closing of pockets of ignorance in the market—by allowing
entrepreneurs to acquire, in one transaction, a bundle of rights to attributes (i.e., a
distinct asset).  This means that the parties don’t have to engage in costly bargaining
over many rights to single attributes.  The dissipation of value is at a minimum.
Asset ownership also implies that one, at least as a starting point, possesses
the rights to unspecified, hitherto undiscovered uses of the asset.  Thus, for this
reason an entrepreneur may prefer to acquire ownership of an asset rather than
acquire a specified, finite list of rights to uses of an asset.  In other words,
ownership is a low-cost means of allocating the rights to attributes of assets that are
discovered by the entrepreneur/owner.  In a well-functioning legal system,
ownership of an asset normally implies that the courts will not interfere when an
entrepreneur/owner discovers and captures new attributes of his asset.  A
consequence of this is that it is not normally required that the entrepreneur/owner
enters into costly negotiation with those agents that are affected his discovery.  In
this way, too, the dissipation of value is minimized.  However, there is also an
                                                 
11 One obvious, but non-economic reason is that the legal system distinguishes between the law
relating to contract and the law relating to ownership of assets.
12  In contrast, it not so easy to find a room for ownership in mainstream economics.  This is typically
accomplished by introducing the non-mainstream notion of bounded rationality, which means that
contracts become incomplete, leaving a role for ownership (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and
Moore 1990; Hart 1995).   However, this literature is open to charges of working with ad hoc
assumptions and even inconsistency (see Tirole 1999; Maskin and Tirole 1999).
8incentive effect of asset ownership.   More specifically, asset ownership implies a
legally recognized right to the income of that asset, including the right to income
from discovered attributes.  Thus, one function of ownership is the distinct
incentive it provides for entrepreneurial discovery, particularly, of course, to the
extent that this discovery goes beyond mere luck and requires effort. 13
Productive and Destructive Entrepreneurship
So far our argument has been that the modern Austrian perspective on the
economic process as one of entrepreneurial discovery (Kirzner 1973, 1997) dovetails
with insights on property rights and ownership derived from the work of older
Austrians and from property rights theorists such as Barzel (1997).  This
combination of ideas yields new insights in both entrepreneurship and property
rights and ownership, as we have seen.  A further implication relates to the
distinction between productive and destructive entrepreneurship.  In Austrian
economics, there seems to be a general claim that all entrepreneurial discovery is
socially beneficial (Mises 1949; Kirzner 1973).14  However, a property rights
perspective reveals that this claim is unwarranted; the capture of rights over
attributes may be socially harmful.  It is therefore necessary to make a distinction
between productive and destructive entrepreneurship.
As a general matter the capture of rights refers to taking control of attributes of
assets.  When such capture requires the use of resources for discovering new
attributes and taking control over these without compensating others on the margin
and in such a way that joint surplus (net social benefits) is reduced, we shall speak
of “destructive entrepreneurship.” Thus, discovering new morally hazardous ways
of behavior (Holmström 1982), effecting hold-ups (Williamson 1996), and inventing
new ways of engaging in rent-seeking activities relative to government (Baumol
1990) are examples of destructive entrepreneurship in the sense that these represent
the discovery of new attributes that decrease joint surplus. “Productive
entrepreneurship” refers to the discovery of new attributes, where this discovery
leads to an increase in joint surplus.  For example, a franchisee may discover new
local tastes that in turn may form the basis for new products for the entire chain; an
employee may discover better uses of production assets and communicate this to
the TQM team of which he is a member; a CEO may discover a new business
concept; etc.
In the following section, we shall argue that many cooperative relations,
involving potential gains from trade, are characterized by tradeoffs between
productive and destructive entrepreneurial activities. Various types of economic
organization, broadly conceived, arise in order to strike efficient tradeoffs.
                                                 
13 See also Klein (1996) and Klein and Klein (2000).  This links up with the emphasis in the Misesian
tradition on the necessity of ownership for “calculation,” that is, the formation of market prices for
capital goods with many different uses (Mises 1936; Salerno 1999).
14  To some extent this is because entrepreneurship is only seen as an arbitrage activity, at least in the
most influential Austrian work on the subject, namely Kirzner (1973, 1997).
9III. Implications for Economic Organization
Economic Organization in an Entrepreneur Economy
In an entrepreneur economy, there are two basic problems that efficient
economic organization must address in addition to those traditionally considered in
the modern economics of organization (i.e., moral hazard and hold-up). The first
such problem concerns the control of destructive entrepreneurial activities, that is,
an agent’s possibilities of discovering new attributes of assets that he will be able to
control without making marginal payments to others and reducing joint surplus.
For example, firms may delimit the use by employees of telephone and internet
services, by closely specifying their use rights over the relevant assets.  As that
example suggests, firms are unlikely to be entirely successful in their attempt to
curb such activities.  Thus, creative employees may, for example, invent ways of
covering their (mis-)use of the internet, which in turn may destruct additional
value.  However, the various constraints that firms impose on employees (or, more
generally, contracting partners on each other) may have the side-effect that
productive entrepreneurship is stifled (cf. Kirzner 1985).
More generally, a key problem of economic organization is to stimulate the
productive discovery of new attributes of assets, through, for example, quality
circles,  letting employees spend a certain amount of company time on activities of
their own choice, etc.  This amounts to making the relation between principals and
agents (a firm and its employees; a firm and its R&D departments; a firm and its
supplier, etc.) less completely specified. Thus, an important choice exists with
respect to choosing tradeoffs between productive and destructive entrepreneurial
activities.  In the following section, we construct a simple, stylized example that
involves this trade-off and discuss various implications of that example.
Organizing A Productive Relationship
Consider a productive relation between two agents, X and Y, that involves the
use of a multi-attribute asset.15  The relation can be organized so that X is principal
and Y agent, or vice versa.  Moreover, there are complementarities between the
parties’ activities.  Because of these complementarities, there are gains from trade.
The relation is governed by a contract, the degree of incompleteness of which is a
choice variable.  The contract terms that are stipulated in the (incomplete) contract
can be perfectly enforced.  We adopt this admittedly extreme assumption in order to
abstract from those aspects of economic organization under incomplete contracting
that turn on enforcement issues.
In principle, X and Y can write a complete contract. However, in the example
we assume that this is never optimal.  There are costs as well as benefits associated
with contractual incompleteness, and, hence, an optimum level of incompleteness.
Incompleteness is motivated by the Austrian assumption that if X (Y) hires Y (X) as
                                                 
15 The issue of whether the asset is alienable or inalienable and who owns it is treated
later.
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an employee or a contractor, he cannot know all the possible attributes of the asset
that Y (X) may discover.  As we have argued, this provides the possibilities for
productive as well as destructive entrepreneurship, where these possibilities can be
constrained by contract terms.
When X (Y) hires Y, he holds expectations (measured in certainty equivalents)
about the consequences for the monetary joint surplus (henceforth, simply “joint
surplus”) of Y’s (X’s) productive and destructive entrepreneurial activities as
functions of the degree of discretion Y (X) is granted through the contract.  Thus,
although X (Y) is not likely to be able to fully specify what the Y (X) will discover,16
X (Y) still holds a subjective expectation of the consequences for the joint surplus of
the Y’s (X’s) entrepreneurship.17  Figure 1 maps the X’s (Y’s) expectations with
respect to the impact on joint surplus of Y’s (X’s)  productive and destructive
entrepreneurship.
XXXXXXXX Insert figure 1 here XXXXXXXX
More specifically, the figure shows total benefits and costs of productive and
destructive entrepreneurship as functions of the degree of contractual constraints.
For the moment, it will suffice to think of “the degree of contractual
incompleteness” in terms of the time that Y (X) is allowed to work on his own ideas,
using the asset(s) in any way he sees fit.
The P-curve thus shows the total benefits from productive entrepreneurship as
a function of the free time Y (X) is given.  The claim is that, as Y (X) is given more
freedom, he will engage in more productive entrepreneurship, that is, he will
discover more beneficial attributes of the productive asset(s) he operates.  For
example, he may discover new ways of making the assets more effective or new
markets to which the asset’s services may be deployed.  We will assume that Y’s
(X’s) realization of some private benefit (i.e., a non-transferable utility) of engaging
in productive entrepreneurial activities provides sufficient motivation for him.
Although these ideas are distinctly unconventional (at least in the context of
the economics of organization), they are not unrealistic.  For example, firms such as
3M allocate time to research employees that they are basically free to use in almost
any way they see fit in the hope that this will produce serendipitous discoveries.
Many consulting firms do something similar.  Of course, many industrial firms have
known for a long time that the jobs of research employees must be constrained in
different, and typically much looser, ways from those of employees with more
routine tasks.  The increasing emphasis on ”empowerment” during the last decades
reflects a realization that employees derive a private benefit from controlling aspects
of their job situation.   And it is a key point in the total quality movement that
                                                 
16 If he could do so, there would be no need for the agent’s discovery.
17 This may be seen as akin to the assumption in the new property rights approach that although
agents cannot foresee all contingencies, they still anticipate pay-offs probabilistically. Frank Knight
(1921) argued that a key executive function is forming judgment of other people’s judgment.  This
captures much of the idea of our construct here.
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delegating various rights to employees provides sufficient motivation for these
employees to engage in activities that amount to finding ways to increase the mean
and reduce the variance of quality (Jensen and Wruck 1994) —that is, what we call
productive entrepreneurship.
 The relation between total benefits and more free time is a strictly concave
one.  The decreasing marginal returns from new discoveries may be caused by the
increasing difficulties of implementing the new discoveries, given that X (Y) and the
Y (X) are constrained in terms of the time that is available for productive activities.
Alternatively, Y’s (X’s) attention is more focused on making valuable discoveries
when he has less free time than when he has more.
In the absence of destructive entrepreneurial activities, the first-best simply is
giving Y (X) full freedom.  However, in our Austrian set-up, the first-best cannot be
reached because X (Y)  cannot completely constrain Y’s (X’s) destructive
entrepreneurial activities. The D-curve shows X’s (Y’s) expectations of Y’s (X’s)
destructive entrepreneurial activities as a function of being given more time that he
can use as he sees fit.  Thus, with increased discretion over multi-attribute assets, Y
(X) will discover more new ways of controlling attributes, which increases his own
benefit, but reduces expected joint surplus.
As drawn in figure 1, the optimum degree of contractual incompleteness is
given by CI* where the contribution to joint surplus is at the maximum (S*).
Who Will Become the Principal and How Will the Surplus be Shared?
So far, we have implicitly assumed that one of parties involved in the relation
has comparative advantages in direction and that efficiency requires that he
becomes the principal.  This is consistent with standard mainstream principal-agent
theory which also simply assumes that one of the parties is principal, but provides
little or no justification for this assumption.  However, our setup allows to
determine who will become principal.  This choice depends on four factors, namely
the distribution of comparative advantages in direction (which influences
productive entrepreneurship) and in monitoring (which influences destructive
entrepreneurship),18 and on the distribution of comparative advantages in
productive and destructive entrepreneurship. For example, with respect to
direction, one of the parties may have a comparative advantage in finding the most-
valued uses of the other party’s human capital, because he has superior knowledge
of the market opportunities for the productive relation (as in Casson 1997).19
Consider figure 2a.
XXXXXXXX Insert figure 2a here XXXXXXXX
                                                 
18 However, comparative advantages in monitoring, while surely relevant in actuality, is excluded by
our assumption of zero cost enforcement of contract terms.
19 Although we in the example focus on the agent’s entrepreneurship, we may thus also ascribe
entrepreneurial qualities to the principal as well.
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Figure 2a is based on the assumption that the D-curve describing how destructive
entrepreneurship impacts on joint surplus as a function of contractual
incompleteness is the same for both agents.  However, their capacities for
productive entrepreneurship is now assumed to differ.  This is reflected in the two
different P-curves, P1 and P2.  These map the parties’ expectations with respect to
the total benefit of Y’s productive entrepreneurship as an agent when X is principal,
and the total benefit of X’s productive entrepreneurship as an agent when Y is
principal, respectively.20  There are two different levels of contractual
incompleteness, CI1* and CI2*, and two corresponding levels of joint surplus, S1*
and S2*.  In expectational equilibrium (Hayek 1937), that is, when the individuals’
subjective expectations are consistent with each other,21 X will assume the role of
principal and hire Y as his agent.  This arrangement, where X expects to receive (S1*-
S2*) as his  rent and Y expects to receive S2*, maximizes expected joint surplus. Y’s
participation constraint is satisfied, since he receives a rent (which reflects his
opportunity cost when he assumes the role of principal).  He will thus accept the
contract.
It is easy to see that comparative advantages in destructive entrepreneurship
may also influence who will be principal and who will be agent.  Consider figure 2b.
XXXXXXXX Insert figure 2b here XXXXXXXX
In figure 2b, Y has a comparative advantage in destructive entrepreneurship; hiring
him as an agent dissipates more value for all levels of contractual incompleteness
than hiring X as an agent.   Thus, it will maximize joint surplus to let him assume
the role of principal.
Who Will  Own the Asset?
We have assumed that the relation involves the use of a multi-attribute asset.
However, we have said little about the nature of that asset, except that the agent’s
entrepreneurial activities takes place relative to this asset, and we have not
discussed who should own the asset.  The issues are related.  If, for example, the
relevant asset is the agent’s inalienable human capital, he will, of course, also be the
owner of the asset.  However, it is more interesting to assume that some alienable
asset, say, a “machine,” is involved in the relation.  We exclude the possibility of
renting the machine, so either the principal or the agent will own it.
In order to understand who will become the asset owner, note that ownership
confers the right to appropriate residual returns as well as the right to control the
use of discovered new attributes of the asset to which one holds title.  While the
former function of ownership is highlighted in the modern economics of
                                                 
20 The curves incorporate both the effect of direction and the effect of the parties’ “innate” capabilities
of productive entrepreneurship.
21 But not necessarily with the objective data.  Thus, there may be ex post disequilibrium.  Thus, to
maintain an Austrian flavor to the analysis we don’t assume common knowledge or rational
expectations, in contrast to contract theory.
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organization, notably in the property rights approach, we have argued that the
latter function is one that is associated with an Austrian approach.  It is this latter
function that we focus on here.22
Note that in figures 1 and 2 we have focused directly on monetary joint surplus.
However, this excludes from consideration the fact that the agent realizes a private
benefit from destructive as well as productive entrepreneurship.  Per definition,
such non-transferable utilities cannot enter into the determination of joint surplus.
However, they may be important to understanding who, in the example, will have
ownership to the machine.
Assume that the agents are in expectational equilibrium with respect to the
impact on joint surplus of productive and destructive entrepreneurship with X (Y)
as principal and Y (X) as agent.  While CI1* and CI2* are the preferred levels of
contractual incompleteness of X and Y, when acting as principals, these levels are
not likely to be their preferred points when they act as agents.23  For example, an
agent is likely to prefer to have less restrictions imposed on him than the principal
prefers if the agent realizes more private benefit from engaging in destructive
entrepreneurial activities than he gets from productive entrepreneurial activities.
Assume now that an agent whose preferred point differs from that of the
principal is the owner of the machine.  Because of his ownership of the machine, the
agent has the power to veto the contract that the principal suggests.  For example,
the principal may demand that the machine is used in certain ways for a certain
amount of time, and the agent may simply refuse this.  Bargaining may take place,
but is likely to be costly, because of the private nature of the agent’s benefits.  Value
will not be dissipated by this sort of bargaining if instead the principal owns the
asset.  Thus, ownership is a means of implementing the principal’s preferred degree
of contractual incompleteness in a low-cost way. This illustrates both of the
functions that we have argued is associated with ownership in an Austrian
perspective, namely to stimulate entrepreneurship (i.e., implementing the preferred
degree of contractual incompleteness of the party with the comparative advantage
in directing) and to ease exchange (i.e., minimizing the dissipation of value through
bargaining).
Our theory of ownership as a means of implementing a preferred degree of
contractual incompleteness and therefore a certain combination of productive and
destructive entrepreneurship has application beyond the determination of who, in a
productive relation will be the owner.  It can also cast light over the more general
issue of why a certain agent earns a certain asset, irrespective of the productive and
                                                 
22 Moreover, note that the modern property rights view of ownership as a means to appropriate
residual returns is not relevant in the present context, since we have made no assumption about
sunk-cost investments or costly effort.
23 More precisely, the agent’s and the principal’s preferred point will only coincide if the agent is
completely indifferent between allocating time to destructive and productive entrepreneurship.  If
that is the case, he will always prefer the highest wage that he is offered by the principal, and the
principal’s and the agent’s preferred points will coincide.
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contractual relations that he is involved in.  The theory of ownership presented in
Hart (1995) turns on the hold-up problem: One should own those assets that are
complementary to one’s (non-contractible) human capital investments, since this
increases one’s (ex post) bargaining power and thus the rents that may be expected
from investments. This seems to be a less than general explanation: People own a lot
of things the ownership of which cannot be explained by hold-up considerations.
Another insight, more akin to Austrian ideas, is to argue that those who discover
new knowledge have an incentive to use it themselves because of the transaction
costs of knowledge transfer.  Given this, there is a general tendency for ownership of
complementary assets to move to the knowledge source (rather than the other
around), because knowledge is harder to trade than most other resources (Foss 1993;
Casson 1997). The problem with this explanation is that it is does not allow to
analytically distinguish between ownership and rental agreements.  Our theory can
do this, however.
For example, suppose that a car rental company put very few constraints in the
contracts they offer renters, so that the latter could use the company’s cars for the
purpose of running a taxi business or a truck operation.  Thus, the company does not
much constrain productive and destructive entrepreneurship.  In actuality, however, a
car rental company will normally prefer to circumscribe in a relatively detailed way
the possible productive and destructive entrepreneurship that the renter can engage
in.  For example, usually rental cars cannot be used for commercial purposes, among
other things because the company fears that the car will not be driven in a proper
way, and that this will diminish the demand of other renters for the car’s services.
Thus, in order to maintain demand and control externalities the company constrain
the use of the car in many ways.  However, a renter who wishes to use a rental car for
entrepreneurial, commercial purposes is not likely to find the constraints imposed by
the car rental company to be optimal.  Hence, he may prefer to own the car in order to
be able to impose his own preferred way of using the car, that is, he owns the car in
order to carry out his own entrepreneurial plans.24
The Many Tradeoffs of Entrepreneurship and the Complex Structure of Economic
Organization
In order to identify a fundamental problem, namely the optimal combination
of productive and destructive entrepreneurship, and draw some implications of this
(who will be the principal? who will own the asset?), we have suppressed many
relevant tradeoffs by making extreme assumptions.  For example, we have assumed
that in principle all contractual constraints could be costlessly specified and
enforced; the only reason why they may not all be specified was because this would
suppress entrepreneurial discovery.
                                                 
24 Of course, in this situation car rental companies may increase earnings by offering differentiated
products, where rental fees and contractual constraints differ for different segments of the market, or
new firms may arise to special-purpose segments of the market.   However, even those firms that
offer cars with fewer or other contractual constraints may be too constraining for some persons,
particularly those who (expects that they) are likely to discover yet unimagined activities (i.e.,
entrepreneurs).  They will still want to become owners.
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However, in the presence of costs of drafting contracts and measuring and
enforcing contractual compliance this is an unrealistic assumption. In actuality, even
the most routine-based job cannot be fully comprehensively described and
monitored (Knight 1921), so that the agent will always have some possibilities of
exercising entrepreneurship, for example, discovering ways of using tools in new
ways, new ways of working slightly slower or slightly faster, etc.  As argued earlier,
such entrepreneurship may have both a productive and a destructive component.
The impact of entrepreneurship on joint surplus is dependent on the types of the
constraints that are imposed on the agent.
In practice, the trade-off may be regulated by limiting the budget to which the
agent has access (Jensen and Meckling 1992), the activities that he can engage in
(Holmström 1989), the people with whom he can work (Holmström and Milgrom
1990), the type of equipment to which he has access, and how he is allowed to
operate that equipment (Barzel 1997).  For example, regulating with whom an agent
is allowed to interact clearly influences destructive as well as productive
entrepreneurship; on the one hand, it may lead to destructive collusion among
agents (as in Holmström and Milgrom 1990), on the other hand it may lead to the
generation of new ideas.
Defining and monitoring constraints are clearly costly activities, that is, they
are costly in terms of the principal’s opportunity cost.  This means that many
margins will rationally be left open; the problem is then one of choosing the optimal
constraints to impose on the agent(s).  Because of entrepreneurship, this is an
inherently difficult undertaking.  Thus, imposing certain constraints on an
entrepreneurial agent may lead to his discovery of new margins on which he
engage in destructive entrepreneurship —activities that may be worse in terms of
their impact on monetary joint surplus than those which the constraints seek to curb
(Cheung 1969). This is a basic, potential trade-off that a forward-looking principal
must consider.
IV. Other Theories of Economic Organization
As already indicated, the approach of this paper is in several ways different from
the mainstream in the economics of organization.  Thus, we have sidestepped the
issue of motivating the agent by means of explicit incentives by assuming that the
agent realized a private benefit from having the freedom to engage in
entrepreneurial activities that provide sufficient motivation for him to engage in
these activities.  This is not because we consider explicit incentives unimportant, but
rather because we think the assumption that the agents can be (partly) motivated by
being given more influence over their job situation is a realistic one (and a neglected
one, too).
This also indicates how our approach differs from the new property rights
approach (Hart 1995) and the transaction cost approach (Williamson 1996).  In both
16
of these two approaches it is assumed that contractual incompleteness is usually
dominated by contractual completeness in terms of welfare.25  In contrast, we have
argued that attempts to write complete contracts may lead to entrepreneurial
activity, including productive entrepreneurial activity, may be curbed.  Thus,
contracts are incomplete in our story, not because of contract drafting costs (as in,
e.g., Crocker and Reynolds 1993), but because transacting individuals rationally
choose to leave contracts incomplete.  The optimal degree of incompleteness of
contracts is thus explained in completely different ways.  Moreover, in contrast to
the new property rights approach, the role of ownership is not so much to be a
bargaining chip in situations of bilateral monopoly, but rather is a means by which
an entrepreneur may implement and enforce his preferred degree of contractual
incompleteness in a low-cost way (e.g., decide on organizational structure).  Thus,
the role of ownership in our story is to stimulate entrepreneurship and ease
exchange.  In contrast, while investments are usually influenced by the allocation of
ownership in the property rights approach, entrepreneurship is not a relevant
consideration in this approach.
In spite of these differences, our approach is related to some other approaches
and contributions in the contemporary economics of organization.   Most notably,
we stress the inspiration from the works of Barzel (1987, 1994, 1997).  In particular,
Barzel’s (1987) endogenization of who will become entrepreneur (i.e. principal) is
close in spirit to the present paper, although Barzel’s story puts all the emphasis on
incentives and the opportunity costs of monitoring (see also Khalil and Lawarrée
1995). Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) paper emphasizes the role of delegation in
fostering incentives, and also stress that the delegation of authority has not only
incentive effects, but also influences the agent’s participation.  Delegation thus
raises the agent’s utility.  In contrast, agents dislike being overruled by the
principal.  These assumptions are close in spirit to our basic assumption that agents
derive private benefits from being less constrained in their job.  The assumption in
our approach that agents may discover multiple attributes of the assets with which
they work may also be seen as an entrepreneurial version of the multi-task agency
models of Holmström and Milgrom (1991).  Finally, our idea of ownership as the
principal’s instrument for implementing his preferred degree of contractual
incompleteness is akin to Holmström’s (1999) point that ownership is important in
the context of the theory of the firm, not because it diminishes exposure to hold-up
per se, but rather because it allows the owner/manager to impose his preferred
incentive systems, rules and regulations on employees.
V. Conclusion
In most of mainstream economics, “… there is no room for the entrepreneurial
discovery process not only in the sense that no opportunities for pure profit can
                                                 
25 Although important recent work has demonstrated that the first-best may be achieved even under
incomplete contracting, given certain constraints on renegotiation design (e.g., one party has all the
bargaining power) (Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey 1994).
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possibly exist, but also in the sense that the model precludes all Knightian
uncertainty that might affect the character of the individual decision” (Kirzner 1997:
70).  This is also the case of the modern economics of organization.  In contrast, by
starting from Austrian and property rights ideas, we have argued that it is possible
to make room for entrepreneurial activities in the economics of organization, and
that such an approach can pose new questions and give new answers (e.g., who will
assume the role of principal and who of agent?), and can give new answers to
traditional questions (e.g., who will own the asset?).
We began by arguing that from an Austrian perspective, the contracting space
is in principle always open-ended, since there are always margins to discovered
over which agents may optimize their gains.  The property rights approach argues
that  the presence of measurement costs and costs of enforcement means that not all
attributes will be enforced and not all actions will be monitored. However,
principals may still constrain agents’ opportunities for entrepreneurial discovery in
various ways, for example, by deciding on which equipment an agent can work
with and how, etc. In fact, we have argued that principals will usually optimally
constrain entrepreneurial agents, since the discovery of new margins will not
necessarily lead to increases in joint surplus; unproductive rent-seeking may well
be one outcome of entrepreneurial activity.  In such a setting, we argued that the
function of ownership is to give the principal the bargaining power to implement
his preferred combination of productive and destructive entrepreneurship, while
still leaving a rent for the agent.  This partly accounts for structures of ownership
and for the structure of contracts.  More generally, the property rights systems in
firms are structured so as to handle the many dimensions of the basic combination
of productive and unproductive entrepreneurial activities.  Fourth, the combination
of productive and unproductive entrepreneurial activities are not the sole
determinants of economic organization, including ownership structures;
entrepreneurial abilities, monitoring and much else also matter.
Much more work remains to be done on the connection between
entrepreneurship and economic organization.  Only few contributions exist on the
subject (e.g., Barzel 1987; Gifford 1999).  However, it is increasingly recognized by
business people and business academics that a major contemporary challenge for
firms is to install entrepreneurship at levels of the organization (e.g., Day and
Wendler 1998).  Clearly, the mainstream economics of organization has much to
offer here, for example, with respect to the design of compensation schemes and
commitment problems in entrepreneurial organizations.  The suggestion of this
paper is that ideas from economics on entrepreneurship should also be included in
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Determining who should be principal; allowing P to vary
P1 – total benefit of Y’s productive
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